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Abstract: The prevailing literature discusses intergenerational trade-offs in climate
change predominantly in terms of the Ramsey equation relying on the infinitely
lived agent model. We discuss these trade-offs in a continuous time OLG frame-
work and relate our results to the infinitely lived agent setting. We identify three
shortcomings of the latter: First, underlying normative assumptions about social
preferences cannot be deduced unambiguously. Second, the distribution among gen-
erations living at the same time cannot be captured. Third, the optimal solution
may not be implementable in overlapping generations market economies.
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1 Introduction
How much should society invest into avoiding or at least extenuating anthropogenic climate
change? A key determinant of the optimal mitigation and investment levels is the social dis-
count rate and a heated debate has evolved over its quantification. We analyze whether the
infinitely lived agent (ILA) model employed in this debate is suitable to discuss the involved
intergenerational trade-offs. For our analysis, we develop a new continuous time overlapping
generations (OLG) growth model and compare the discounting formulas resulting from the
ILA and the OLG framework. Our approach uncovers normative assumptions of calibration-
based approaches to climate change assessment and explores equity and consistency concerns
in normative approaches that refuse intergenerational discounting.
The Stern (2007) review on the economics of climate change, carried out by the former World
Bank Chief Economist on behalf of the British government, has drawn significant attention
in the political arena. It implies an optimal carbon tax that differs by an order of magnitude
from the optimal tax derived by Nordhaus (2008) in his widely known integrated assessment
model DICE.1 Nordhaus (2007) shows that this difference is almost fully explained by the
different assumptions on social discounting as summarized in the Ramsey equation.2 Nordhaus
himself favors a positive approach to social discounting using a calibration-based procedure
that attempts to avoid explicit normative assumptions. In contrast, Stern (2007) advocates
a normative approach emphasizing that only ethical considerations are valid to address the
intergenerational trade-off.
The debate over the right discount rate almost exclusively relies on the Ramsey equation. The
Ramsey equation characterizes how an ILA trades off consumption possibilities at different
points in time. Contributors to the climate change discussion usually interpret the ILA frame-
work as a utilitarian social welfare function, associating each point in time with the utility
of a different generation. The real world is inhabited by overlapping generations, who value
their own future consumption and possibly that of future generations. Barro (1974) shows
that appropriate assumptions on altruism and operational bequests imply that finitely lived
overlapping generations aggregate into a representative ILA. However, recent empirical studies
indicate that the altruistic bequest motive is rather weak.3 As a consequence, the dominant
share of savings is driven by individual life-cycle planning rather then by altruistic transfers for
future generations. Therefore, a calibration of the Ramsey equation to observed interest rates
will necessarily reflect preference parameters that deal with individuals’ life-cycle planning over
1 Integrated assessment models augment economic growth models with a climate module, directly considering
feedbacks between economic activity and climate change.
2 In line with the environmental economic literature we call the Euler equation of the Ramsey-Kass-Koopmans
growth model “Ramsey equation”.
3 See, e.g., Hurd (1987, 1989), Kopczuk and Lupton (2007), Laitner and Juster (1996), Laitner and Ohlsson
(2001), Wilhelm (1996). These papers suggest either that the bequest motive is statistically insignificant,
economically irrelevant, or, if there is a considerable bequest motive, that it is not of the altruistic type (in
the sense of Barro 1974 and Becker 1974) but originates from other sources such as the “joy of giving”. In all
these cases an OLG economy does not reduce to an ILA economy.
1
their finite lifetime. Confined to an ILA framework, the current discounting debate is not ca-
pable of disentangling a social planner’s discounting of future generations from an individual’s
discounting of his own future utility.
For our analysis, we develop a novel continuous time OLG model around two desiderata.
First, in order to relate as closely as possible to the standard Ramsey equation, we choose
a model in continuous time where agent’s live a finite deterministic life span. In contrast
to the models based on Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985), where agents have an infinite
lifetime and a constant probability of death, our model explicitly captures life-cycles. Second,
we incorporate economic growth via exogenous technological change in order to make reasonable
statements about intergenerational distribution. This feature is also a crucial distinction from
the most closely related model in the literature by d’Albis (2007) who examines the influence of
demographic structure on capital accumulation. Similar to Calvo and Obstfeld (1988), Burton
(1993) and Marini and Scaramozzino (1995), we introduce a social planner maximizing the
discounted life time utilities of the OLG.
Our analysis derives several theorems on the observational equivalence (identical macroeco-
nomic aggregates) between the OLG frameworks and the ILA model. However, we show that
the seemingly positive calibration of an ILA model to observed market outcomes involves nor-
mative assumptions. In particular, these assumptions imply that the social planner’s pure rate
is higher than that of the individuals living in the economy. Moreover, we show that the norma-
tive approach to discounting in the ILA setting overlooks a conflict between intergenerational
equity and distributional equity among generations alive. Finally, we find that a social planner
who is limited to tax labor and capital income cannot achieve the first-best social optimum
without age-discriminatory tax schedules.
Related to our analysis, Aiyagari (1985) showed that under certain conditions an overlapping
generations model with two-period-lived agents exhibits the same paths of aggregate capital
and consumption as the discounted dynamic programming model with infinitely lived agents
in discrete time. We complement these results by explicitly deriving the relation between the
preference parameters of the OLG model and the observationally equivalent ILA framework
in continuous time. The equivalence between the social planner solution in a continuous time
OLG setting and an ILA model was already observed by Calvo and Obstfeld (1988). While
they focus on time inconsistencies in fiscal policy, our focus is on intergenerational trade-offs.
Several environmental economic applications employ numerical simulations of integrated as-
sessment models to compare interest rates and climate policy between ILA models and OLG
frameworks in which agents live for two or three periods. Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2000)
point at differences between the models as a consequence of aging and distributional policies.
Howarth (1998) compares the simulation results of a decentralized OLG, a constrained, and
an unconstrained utilitarian OLG to the results obtained by Nordhaus (1994) using the ILA
model DICE. While the decentralized OLG yields similar results as DICE, he finds substantial
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differences for the utilitarian OLGs. Calibrating time preference, Howarth (2000) shows that
the unconstrained utilitarian OLG model and the ILA model can produce similar outcomes.
Stephan et al. (1997) provide a simulation yielding equivalence between a decentralized OLG
with bounded rationality and an ILA economy with limited foresight. In contrast, our model
elaborates the analytical conditions under which the continuous time ILA and OLG frameworks
are observationally equivalent. Burton (1993) and Marini and Scaramozzino (1995) analyze the
relationship between individual welfare maximization and the optimal outcome of a benevolent
social planner in an overlapping generations model with resources or environmental pollution.
With this literature, our paper shares the insight that OLG models provide crucial insights
about intergenerational trade-offs that cannot be captured in infinitely lived agent models.
The next section explains the positive and normative approaches to social discounting and lays
out the further structure of the paper.
2 Nordhaus, Stern and the Relation between ILA and OLG Models
The integrated assessment literature and the social discounting debate abstract from the real
world OLG economy to an ILA model. Integrated assessment models either calibrate an ILA
economy to the real world or fill in preference parameters based on ethical arguments. Then, the
ILA is interpreted as a social planner evaluating climate policy. However, an OLG world reveals
household preferences based on life cycle investment decisions. A social planner evaluating
climate change faces a time horizon exceeding that of individual life cycle planning and his
decisions affect future generations.
The majority of economists in the climate change debate takes an observation-based approach
to social discounting. This view is exemplarily laid out in Nordhaus’ (2007) critical review of the
Stern (2007) review of climate change. Individual preferences towards climate change mitigation
cannot be observed directly in market transactions because of the public good characteristic
of greenhouse gas abatement. However, we observe everyday investment decisions on capital
markets that carry information on intertemporal preferences. In particular, we observe the
market interest rate and the steady state growth rate of the economy. The positive approach
translates this information into (pairs of) time preference and a measure for the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. Then, this ILA is interpreted as a utilitarian social planner who
confronts the climate problem in an integrated assessment model.
The normative approach to social discounting aims at treating all generations alike and, there-
fore, argues that a positive rate of time preference is non-ethical. This view is supported by a
number of authors including Ramsey (1928), Pigou (1932), Harrod (1948), Koopmans (1965),
Solow (1974), Broome and Schmalensee (1992) and Cline (1992). The Stern (2007) review of
climate change effectively uses a zero rate of time preference, but adopts the parameter value
ρR = 0.1% in order to capture a small but positive probability that society becomes extinct.4
4 Strictly speaking this is not time preference, but Yaari (1965) shows the equivalence of discounting because of
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Our major presumption is that the world looks more like an overlapping generations model than
an infinitely-lived agent framework. Accordingly, we interpret the real world (without policy
intervention) as a decentralized OLG economy. In section 3, we develop the decentralized,
continuous time OLG model and establish conditions for existence and uniqueness of a steady
state. Section 4 recalls the ILA Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans economy employed in the current
discounting debate. Section 5 analyzes the relation between the preference parameters of OLG
households and the ILA for observationally equivalent economies. In Section 6, we introduce a
social planner into the OLG model and examine the relationship between this utilitarian OLG
economy, the ILA model, and the decentralized OLG economy. We consider the case where
the utilitarian social planner can fully control the economy as well as the situation where
the planner is limited to non-age discriminatory taxes on labor and capital income. Section 7
discusses the consequences of our findings for intergenerational discounting and the debate on
climate change mitigation. We show how the relations between the different models uncover
normative assumptions in the seemingly positive ILA approach, and how the generational
equity trade-off is more intricate than suggested by the normative ILA approach to climate
change evaluation. Section 8 concludes.
3 An OLG Growth Model in Continuous Time
We introduce an OLG exogenous growth model in continuous time and analyze the long-run
individual and aggregate dynamics of a decentralized economy in market equilibrium.
3.1 Households
Consider a continuum of households, each living the finite time span T . All households exhibit
the same intertemporal preferences irrespective of their time of birth s ∈ (−∞,∞). We assume
that if households are altruistic, their altruistic preferences are not sufficiently strong for an
operative bequest motive. This allows us to abstract from altruism in individual preferences.
As a consequence, all households maximize their own welfare U , which is the discounted stream
of instantaneous utility derived from consumption during their lifetime
U(s) ≡
∫ s+T
s
c(t, s)
1− 1
σH
1− 1
σH
exp
[
− ρH(t− s)
]
dt , (1)
where c(t, s) is the consumption at calender time t of households born at time s, σH is the
constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ρH denotes the constant rate of (pure)
time preference of the households. Each household is endowed with one unit of labor at any time
alive, which is supplied inelastically to the labor market at wage w(t). In addition, households
a probability of death/extinction and a corresponding rate of time preference. Our superscript R labels inputs
to the Ramsey equation.
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may save and borrow assets b(t, s) at the interest rate r(t). The household’s budget constraint
is5
b˙(t, s) = r(t)b(t, s) + w(t) − c(t, s) , t ∈ [s, s+ T ] . (2)
Households are born without assets and are not allowed to be indebted at time of death. Thus,
the following boundary conditions apply for all generations s
b(s, s) = 0 , b(s + T, s) ≥ 0 . (3)
Because of the non-operative bequest motive, intertemporal welfare U of a household born at
time s always increases in consumption at time s + T . Thus, in the household optimum the
second boundary condition in equation (3) holds with equality.
Maximizing equation (1) for any given s subject to conditions (2) and (3) yields the well known
Euler equation
c˙(t, s) = σH
[
r(t)− ρH
]
c(t, s) , t ∈ [s, s + T ] . (4)
The behavior of a household born at time s is characterized by the system of differential
equations (2) and (4) and the boundary conditions for the asset stock (3).
At any time t ∈ (−∞,∞) the size of the population N(t) increases at the constant rate ν ≥ 0.
Normalizing the population at time t = 0 to unity implies the birth rate γ6
N(t) ≡ exp[νt] ⇒ γ =
ν exp[νT ]
exp[νT ]− 1
. (5)
3.2 Firms
Consider a continuum of identical competitive firms i ∈ [0, 1]. All firms produce a homogeneous
consumption good under conditions of perfect competition from capital k(t, i) and effective labor
A(t)l(t, i). A(t) characterizes the technological level of the economy and grows exogenously at
a constant rate ξ. Normalizing technological progress at t = 0 to unity implies
A(t) ≡ exp[ξt] . (6)
All firms have access to the same production technology F (k(t, i), A(t)l(t, i)), which exhibits
constant returns to scale and positive but strictly decreasing marginal productivity with respect
5 Throughout the paper, partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts (e.g., Fk(k, l) = ∂F (k, l)/∂k), derivatives
with respect to calendar time t are denoted by dots and derivatives of functions depending on one variable
only are denoted by primes.
6 The equation is derived by solving
∫ t
t−T
γ exp[νs] ds = N(t), where γ exp[νs] denotes the cohort size of the
generation born at time s. Observe that γ → 1/T for ν → 0 and γ → ν for T → ∞. Anticipating definition
(13), we can also write γ = 1/QT (ν).
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to both inputs capital and effective labor. Furthermore, F satisfies the Inada conditions.
Constant returns to scale of the production function and symmetry of the firms allow us to
work with a representative firm whose decision variables are interpreted as aggregate variables.
With minor abuse of notation, we introduce aggregate capital per effective labor, k(t), and
aggregate capital per capita, k¯(t),
k(t) ≡
∫ 1
0 k(t, i) di
A(t)
∫ 1
0 l(t, i) di
, k¯(t) ≡
∫ 1
0 k(t, i) di
N(t)
. (7)
In addition, we define the intensive form production function f
(
k(t)
)
≡ F
(
k(t), 1
)
.
Profit maximization of the representative firm yields for the wage w(t) and the interest rate
r(t)
w(t) = A(t)
[
f
(
k(t)
)
− f ′
(
k(t)
)
k(t)
]
, (8a)
r(t) = f ′
(
k(t)
)
. (8b)
3.3 Market Equilibrium and Aggregate Dynamics
In order to investigate the aggregate dynamics of the economy, we introduce aggregate house-
hold variables per effective labor by integrating over all living individuals and dividing by the
product of technological level and the labor force of the economy. Analogously to equation
(7) we define under slight abuse of notation per effective labor household variables, x(t), and
aggregate household variables per capita, x¯(t),
x(t) ≡
∫ t
t−T x(t, s)γ exp[νs] ds
A(t)
∫ 1
0 l(t, i) di
, x¯(t) ≡
∫ t
t−T x(t, s)γ exp[νs] ds
N(t)
, (9)
where x(t, s) stands for the individual household variables consumption c(t, s) and assets b(t, s).
Assuming that all markets are in equilibrium at all times t implies the following aggregate
dynamics of the economy:7
c˙(t)
c(t)
= σH
[
r(t)− ρH
]
− (ν + ξ)−
∆c(t)
c(t)
, (10a)
k˙(t) = f
(
k(t)
)
− (ν + ξ)k(t)− c(t) , (10b)
7 Note that x˙(t) = −(ν + ξ)x(t) + exp[−(ν + ξ)t]
∫ t
t−T
x˙(t, s)γ exp[νs] ds+ γ
[
x(t, t)− x(t,t−T )
exp[(ν+ξ)T ]
]
exp[−ξt].
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where the term8
∆c(t) ≡
γ exp[ν(t− T )]c(t, t − T )− γ exp[νt]c(t, t)
exp[νt] exp[ξt]
. (10c)
captures the difference in aggregate consumption per effective labor between the generation
born and the generation dying at time t. Substituting the individual household’s Euler equation
(4) into the aggregate Euler equation (10a) and recalling that c˙(t)/c(t) = ˙¯c(t)/c¯(t)−ξ according
to (9), yields the following corollary:
Lemma 1 (Sign of ∆c(t)/c(t))
∆c(t)/c(t) > 0 if and only if
c˙(t, s)
c(t, s)
>
˙¯c(t)
c¯(t)
+ ν for all s ∈ [t− T, t] . (11)
As the right hand side of inequality (11) represents the growth rate of aggregate consumption,
Lemma 1 states that ∆c(t)/c(t) is positive if and only if individual consumption grows faster
than aggregate consumption.
3.4 Steady State
Our analysis will concentrate on the long-run steady state growth path of the economy, in
which both consumption per effective labor and capital per effective labor are constant over
time, i.e., c(t) = c⋆, k(t) = k⋆. From equations (8) follows that in the steady state the interest
rate r(t) = r⋆ ≡ f ′(k⋆) is constant and the wage w(t) grows at the rate of technological progress
ξ. The wage relative to the technology level is constant in the steady state
w⋆ ≡
w(t)
exp[ξt]
∣∣∣∣
k=k⋆
= f(k⋆)− f ′(k⋆)k⋆ . (12)
For T ∈ R++ we define the function QT : R → R+ as
QT (r) ≡
1− exp[−rT ]
r
, ∀ r 6= 0 , (13)
and QT (0) ≡ T . QT (r) can be interpreted as the present value of an annuity received over
T years, at the discount rate r. Properties of the function QT are summarized in Lemma 3
in Appendix A.9. Expressing steady state consumption and wealth of individual households
relative to the technology level returns functions that only depend on the household’s age
8 Note that ∆c(t) includes via c(t, t − T ) and c(t, t) all values of k(s) for s ∈ [t − T, t + T ]. Thus, (10) defines
a system of integro-differential equations. In the steady state, however, ∆c(t)/c(t) = σH
[
r⋆ − ρH
]
− (ν + ξ),
where r⋆ denotes the steady state interest rate.
7
c⋆(a) b⋆(a)
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a a
Figure 1: Steady state paths of consumption (left) and asset (right) for individual households
over age.
a ≡ t− s:
c⋆(a) ≡
c(t, s)
exp[ξt]
∣∣∣∣
k=k⋆
= w⋆
QT (r
⋆− ξ)
QT
(
r⋆− σH(r⋆− ρH)
) exp [(σH(r⋆− ρH)− ξ)a] , (14a)
b⋆(a) ≡
b(t, s)
exp[ξt]
∣∣∣∣
k=k⋆
= w⋆Qa
(
r⋆− σH(r⋆− ρH)
)
exp[(r⋆− ξ)a]
×
[
Qa(r
⋆− ξ)
Qa
(
r⋆− σH(r⋆− ρH)
) − QT (r⋆− ξ)
QT
(
r⋆− σH(r⋆− ρH)
)
]
.
(14b)
Figure 1 illustrates these steady state paths for individual consumption and assets in terms of
the technological level of the economy.9 The individual consumption path grows exponentially
over the lifetime of each generation. Individual household assets follow an inverted U-shape,
i.e., households are born with no assets, accumulate assets in their youth and consume their
wealth towards their death.
Applying the aggregation rule (9), we obtain for the aggregate values per effective labor
c⋆ = w⋆
QT (r
⋆ − ξ)
QT (ν)
QT
(
ν + ξ − σH(r⋆ − ρH)
)
QT
(
r⋆ − σH(r⋆ − ρH)
) , (15a)
b⋆ =
w⋆
r⋆ − ξ
[
QT (ξ + ν − r
⋆)
QT (ν)
− 1
]
−
w⋆
r⋆ − σH(r⋆ − ρH)
×
QT (r
⋆ − ξ)
QT (ν)
QT (ξ + ν − r
⋆)−QT
(
ξ + ν − σH(r⋆ − ρH)
)
QT
(
r⋆ − σH(r⋆ − ρH)
) . (15b)
The following proposition guarantees the existence of a non-trivial steady state for a large class
of production functions including Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions.
9 The calculations use the following model specifications: f(k) = kα, α = 0.3, ρ = 3%, σ = 1, ξ = 1.5%, ν = 0,
T = 50.
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Proposition 1 (Existence of the steady state)
There exists a k⋆ > 0 solving equations (8) and (15) with b⋆ = k⋆ if
lim
k→0
−kf ′′(k) > 0 . (16)
The proof is given in the appendix.
Intuitively, due to the Inada conditions, we obtain f(k) > k for sufficiently small k and f(k) <
k for k sufficiently large. These conditions imply a fixed point b⋆ = k⋆ if the savings rate
1− c(t)/f(k) is sufficiently large for k → 0, which is guaranteed by condition (16). In the proof
of Proposition 1 we show that steady states may be equal to or larger than the golden rule
capital stock kgr, which is implicitly defined by rgr ≡ ν+ξ = f ′ (kgr). As our aim is to compare
the decentralized OLG with an ILA economy, we are particularly interested in steady states
with k⋆ < kgr.10
Definition 1 (Decentralized OLG economy)
(i) The set Γ ≡ {f, ξ, ν, σH , ρH , T} defines a decentralized OLG economy.
(ii) Γ⋆ ∈ {Γ| ∃ k⋆ with 0 < k⋆ < kgr
}
defines a decentralized OLG economy with a dynamically
efficient capital stock k⋆ < kgr. For an economy Γ⋆ we refer by k⋆ and r⋆ to a steady
state satisfying this condition.
The following proposition shows the existence of dynamically efficient economies Γ⋆. Analo-
gously to d’Albis (2007), we introduce the share of capital in output, s(k), and the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor, ǫ(k),
s(k) ≡
kf ′(k)
f(k)
, ǫ(k) ≡ −
f(k)− f ′(k)k
k2f ′′(k)
. (17)
Proposition 2 (Existence and uniqueness of dynamically efficient steady states)
Given that condition (16) holds, there exists a steady state with k⋆ < kgr if
kgr
f(kgr)− rgrkgr
>
Q′T (ν)
QT (ν)
−
Q′T
(
(ν + ξ)(1 − σH) + σHρH
)
QT
(
(ν + ξ)(1 − σH) + σHρH
) . (18)
There exists exactly one k⋆ < kgr if
s(k) ≤ ǫ(k) and
d
dk
(
s(k)
ǫ(k)
)
≥ 0 , (19a)
and, in case that σH > 1,
ρH <
σH − 1
σH
(ν + ξ) . (19b)
10 In the ILA economy steady states with k⋆ ≥ kgr are ruled out by the transversality condition (23).
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The proof is given in the appendix.
Consider a small increase in k. It implies a decrease in the interest rate r and an increase
in wage w, their relative increase being reflected in the elasticity ǫ(k). On the one hand, an
increase in k positively affects the households’ incomes, which would ceteris paribus lead to
higher savings. On the other hand, a decrease in r also affects the households’ saving rates. The
conditions in (19a) ensure that the increase in the aggregate saving rate is sufficiently small
(potentially negative) that the marginal increase in b by a marginal increase in k remains below
one, which guarantees a unique steady state k⋆ = b⋆. Although we cannot solve the implicit
equation k⋆ = b⋆ analytically and, therefore, cannot calculate the steady state interest rate
r⋆, the following proposition determines a lower bound of the steady state interest rates in a
dynamically efficient OLG economy.
Lemma 2 (Lower bound of steady state interest rate)
For any economy Γ∗ (which implies r⋆ > ν + ξ) holds
r⋆ > ρH +
ξ
σH
. (20)
The proof is given in the appendix.
A steady state interest rate r⋆ satisfying condition (20) ensures that per capita consumption
increases at a higher rate than aggregate consumption, which has to hold for aggregate savings
to be positive.
4 Infinitely Lived Agent Economy and Observational Equivalence
As intergenerational trade-offs are mostly discussed in ILA frameworks rather than in OLG
models, we investigate how the macroeconomic observables of an OLG and ILA economy relate
to each other. Therefore, we first introduce the ILA model and then define observational equiv-
alence between two economies. Whenever we compare two different model structures in this
paper we assume that population growth and the production side of the economy are identical.
Variables of the ILA model that are not exogenously fixed to its corresponding counterparts
in the OLG model are indexed by a superscript R. The ILA model abstracts from individual
generations’ life cycles only considering aggregate consumption and asset holdings. In the ILA
model, optimal consumption and asset paths per capita derive from maximizing the discounted
stream of instantaneous utility of consumption per capita weighted by population size
UR ≡
∫ ∞
0
N(t)
c¯(t)
1− 1
σR
1− 1
σR
exp
[
− ρRt
]
dt , (21)
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subject to the budget constraint
˙¯b(t) = [r(t)− ν] b¯(t) + w(t) − c¯(t) . (22)
and the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
b¯(t) exp
[
−
∫ t
0
r(t′) dt′ + νt
]
= 0 . (23)
In the following we assume that the transversality condition is met.11 The solution to the ILA’s
maximization problem is characterized by (22), (23) and the well-known Ramsey equation
r(t) = ρR +
g¯(t)
σR
, (24)
where we denote per capita consumption growth as g¯(t) = ˙¯c(t)/c¯(t). In the steady state we have
g¯(t) = ξ. If markets are in equilibrium at all times (i.e.,
∫ 1
0 l(t, i) di = N(t) and k(t) = b(t)),
the system dynamics of the ILA model in terms of effective labor is given by:
c˙(t)
c(t)
= σR
[
rR(t)− ρR
]
− ξ , (25a)
k˙(t) = f
(
k(t)
)
− (ν + ξ)k(t)− c(t) . (25b)
To compare the different models we use the following definition:
Definition 2 (Observational equivalence)
(i) Two economies A and B are observationally equivalent if coincidence in their current
observable macroeconomic variables leads to coincidence of their future observable macroe-
conomic variables. Formally, if for any cA(0) = cB(0) and kA(0) = kB(0) it holds that
cA(t) = cB(t) and kA(t) = kB(t) for all t ≥ 0.
(ii) Two economies A and B are observationally equivalent in steady state if there exist c⋆
and k⋆ such that both economies are in a steady state.
Note that observational equivalence in the steady state (ii) is weaker than general observational
equivalence (i).
5 Decentralized OLG Versus Infinitely Lived Agent Economy
Now, we investigate under what conditions a decentralized OLG economy, as outlined in Section
3, is observationally equivalent to an ILA economy, as defined in Section 4. The following
proposition states the necessary and sufficient condition:
11 In the steady state, the transversality condition holds if ρR > (1− 1/σR)ξ + ν.
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Proposition 3 (Decentralized OLG versus ILA economy)
(i) A decentralized OLG economy Γ⋆ and an ILA economy are observationally equivalent if
and only if for all t ≥ 0 the following condition holds:
ρR =
σH
σR
ρH +
(
1−
σH
σR
)
r(t) +
1
σR
[
∆c(t)
c(t)
+ ν
]
. (26)
(ii) For any decentralized OLG economy Γ⋆ there exists an ILA economy that is observation-
ally equivalent in the steady state.
(iii) If a decentralized OLG economy Γ⋆ is observationally equivalent in the steady state to an
ILA economy, the following statements hold:
(a) For σR = σH :
ρR = ρH +
1
σR
[
∆c(t)
c(t)
+ ν
]
> ρH . (27)
(b) In general:
ρR > ρH ⇔ σR > σH
[
1 +
1
ξ
(
∆c(t)
c(t)
+ ν
)]−1
. (28)
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 states that any decentralized OLG economy Γ⋆ is – at least in the steady state –
observationally equivalent to an ILA economy for an appropriate choice of
(
σR, ρR
)
. Note that(
σR, ρR
)
is, in general, not uniquely determined by (26).
If we assume that the intertemporal propensity to smooth consumption between two periods
is the same for the households in the OLG and the ILA economy, i.e., σH = σR, we obtain
that ρR > ρH in the steady state. To understand why the pure rate of time preference in the
ILA economy exceeds the corresponding rate in the observationally equivalent OLG economy,
we analyze the term [∆c(t)/c(t) + ν], which is strictly positive in the steady state.
The first part, ∆c(t)/c(t), captures the difference in consumption between the cohort dying
and the cohort just born relative to aggregate consumption. The term is a consequence of the
fact that every individual in the OLG model plans his own life cycle, saving while young and
spending while old. We know from Lemma 1 that ∆c(t)/c(t) > 0 if and only if individual
consumption grows faster than aggregate consumption, which is always satisfied if there is no
population growth, i.e., ν = 0.
The second part, ν, reflects that instantaneous utility in the ILA model is weighted by popu-
lation size. Hence, for a growing population future consumption receives an increasing weight
in the objective function. A corresponding weighting does not occur in the decentralized OLG
economy, where all households only maximize own lifetime utility. As a consequence, the time
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preference rate of an observationally equivalent ILA must be higher to compensate for the
greater weights on future consumption.
Equipping an ILA with a lower intertemporal substitutability than the household in the decen-
tralized OLG economy would ceteris paribus increase the steady state interest rate in the ILA
economy (as opposed to the situation with coinciding elasticities). In order to match the same
observed interest rate as before, the ILA’s rate of time preference has to be lower. Thus, the
time preference relation can flip around if picking the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
of the ILA sufficiently below that of the household in the decentralized OLG economy.
6 Utilitarian OLG Versus Infinitely Lived Agent Economy
Consider an OLG economy, which is governed by a social planner maximizing a social welfare
function. In this section, we investigate the conditions under which this economy is obser-
vationally equivalent to an ILA economy. We assume a utilitarian social welfare function in
which the social planner trades off the weighted lifetime utility of different generations. The
weight consists of two components. First, the lifetime utility of the generation born at time s
is weighted by cohort size. Second, the social planner exhibits a social rate of time preference
ρS > 0 at which he discounts the expected lifetime utility at birth for generations born in the
future.12
Assuming that the social planner maximizes social welfare from t = 0 onward, the social welfare
function consists of two parts: (i) the weighted integral of the remaining lifetime utility of all
generations alive at time t = 0, and (ii) the weighted integral of all future generations
W ≡
∫ 0
−T


∫ s+T
0
c(t, s)
1− 1
σH
1− 1
σH
exp
[
− ρH(t− s)
]
dt

 γ exp[νs] exp[−ρSs]ds
+
∫ ∞
0


∫ s+T
s
c(t, s)
1− 1
σH
1− 1
σH
exp
[
− ρH(t− s)
]
dt

 γ exp[νs] exp[−ρSs]ds .
(29a)
The term in the first curly braces is the (remaining) lifetime utility U(s) of a household born
at time s, as given by equation (1), the functional form of which is a given primitive for the
social planner. The term γ exp[νs] denotes the cohort size of the generation born at time s.
12 We examine the discounted utilitarian social welfare function of, e.g., Calvo and Obstfeld (1988), Burton
(1993) and Marini and Scaramozzino (1995), as it represents the de facto standard in the economic literature.
For a general criticism of discounted utilitarianism, as also employed in the climate change debate by Nordhaus
(2007) and Stern (2007), see, e.g., Sen and Williams (1982) and Asheim and Mitra (2010). Calvo and Obstfeld
(1988) show that social welfare functions which do not treat all present and future generations symmetrically,
i.e., discount lifetime utility to the same point of reference (here the date of birth), may lead to time-inconsistent
optimal plans.
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Changing the order of integration and replacing t− s by age a, we obtain
W =
∫ ∞
0


∫ T
0
c(t, t−a)
1− 1
σH
1− 1
σH
γ exp
[
(ρS− ρH− ν)a
]
da

 exp [(ν −ρS)t]dt . (29b)
In the following, we consider two different scenarios. In the unconstrained utilitarian OLG
economy, a social planner maximizes the social welfare function (29b) directly controlling in-
vestment and household consumption. Thus, the social planner is in command of a centralized
economy. In contrast, in the constrained utilitarian OLG economy the social planner relies
on a market economy, in which the households optimally control their savings and consump-
tion maximizing their individual lifetime utility (1). In this second scenario, the social planner
is constrained to influencing prices by a tax/subsidy regime in order to maximize the social
welfare function (29b).
6.1 Unconstrained Utilitarian OLG Economy
We determine the unconstrained social planner’s optimal allocation by maximizing (29b) sub-
ject to the budget constraint (10b) and the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
k(t) exp
[
−
∫ t
0
f ′
(
k(t′)
)
dt′ + (ξ + ν)t
]
= 0 . (30)
Following the approach of Calvo and Obstfeld (1988), we interpret the unconstrained social
planner’s optimization problem as two nested optimization problems. The first problem is
obtained by defining
V
(
c¯(t)
)
≡ max
{c(t,t−a)}T
a=0
∫ T
0
c(t, t−a)
1− 1
σH
1− 1
σH
γ exp
[
(ρS − ρH − ν)a
]
da , (31)
subject to
∫ T
0
c(t, t−a)γ exp[−νa]da ≤ c¯(t) . (32)
The solution to this maximization problem is the social planner’s optimal distribution of con-
sumption between all generations alive at time t.
Proposition 4 (Optimal consumption distribution for given time t)
The optimal solution of the maximization problem (31) subject to condition (32) is
c(t, t−a) = c¯(t)
QT (ν)
QT
(
ν + σH(ρH − ρS)
) exp [− σH(ρH− ρS)a] . (33)
As a consequence, all households receive the same amount of consumption at time t irrespective
of age for ρH = ρS, and receive less consumption the older (younger) they are at a given time
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a) Decentralized OLG
c) Utilitarian OLG (ρH > ρS)
b) Utilitarian OLG (ρH = ρS)
d) Utilitarian OLG (ρH < ρS)
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T T
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a a
a a
Figure 2: Distribution of consumption across all generations alive at given time t dependent
on age a for the decentralized OLG and three different utilitarian OLGs.
t for ρH > ρS (ρH < ρS).
The proof is given in the appendix.
Proposition 4 states that the difference between the households’ rate of time preference ρH and
the social rate of time preference ρS determines the social planner’s optimal distribution of
consumption across households of different age at some given time t. In particular, if ρH > ρS
the consumption profile with respect to age is qualitatively opposite to that of the decentralized
solution at any time t, as following from the Euler equation (4) and illustrated in Figure 2.13
That is, in the social planner’s solution households receive less consumption the older they
are, whereas they would consume more the older they are in the decentralized OLG economy.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The social planner weighs the lifetime utility of every
individual discounted to the time of birth. Thus, the instantaneous utility at time t of those who
are younger (born later) is discounted for a relatively longer time at the social planner’s time
preference (before birth) and for a relatively shorter time by the individual’s time preference
(after birth) than is the case for the instantaneous utility at time t of those who are older
(born earlier). For ρH > ρS the social planner’s time preference is smaller and, thus, the young
13 We do not take up a stance on the relationship between the individual and the social rate of time preference,
but merely hint at the resulting consequences. This is in line with Burton (1993) and Marini and Scaramozzino
(1995), who argue that they represent profoundly different concepts and, thus, may differ. In fact, ρH trades off
consumption today versus consumption tomorrow within each generation, while ρS trades off lifetime utilities
across generations. If they are supposed to differ, then it is usually assumed that ρH > ρS (see also Heinzel
and Winkler 2011 and von Below 2012).
15
generation’s utility at time t receives higher weight.
Proposition 4 shows that the standard approach of weighted intergenerational utilitarianism
poses a trade-off between intertemporal generational equity and intratemporal generational
equity to the social planner whenever households exhibit a positive rate of time preference.
Lifetime utilities of today’s and future generations would receive equal weight if and only if
the social rate of time preference were zero. Approaching this by a close to zero social time
preference rate, ρH > ρS ≈ 0 implies that at each point in time the young enjoy higher
consumption than the old.14 In contrast, an equal distribution of consumption among the
generations alive is obtained if and only if social time preference matches individual time
preference. However, a positive social rate of time preference comes at the expense of an unequal
treatment of lifetime utilities of different generations. This trade-off practically vanishes only
if the individuals’ and the social planner’s rates of time preference are both very close to zero.
Such an equality trade-off can only be captured in an OLG model which explicitly considers
the life cycles of different generations.
We now turn to the second part of the maximization problem, which optimizes c¯(t) over time.
It is obtained by replacing the term in curly brackets in equation (29b) by the left hand side
of equation (31) resulting in
max
{c¯(t)}∞
t=0
∫ ∞
0
V
(
c¯(t)
)
exp[νt] exp
[
− ρSt
]
dt , (34)
subject to the budget constraint (10b). Observe that problem (34) is formally equivalent to
an ILA economy with the instantaneous utility function V
(
c¯(t)
)
and the time preference rate
ρS.15 We obtain V
(
c¯(t)
)
by inserting the optimal consumption profile (33) into equation (31)
and carrying out the integration
V
(
c¯(t)
)
=
[
QT
(
ν + σH(ρH − ρS)
)
QT (ν)
] 1
σH c¯(t)
1− 1
σH
1− 1
σH
. (35)
The social planner’s maximization problem (34) is invariant under affine transformations of
the objective function (35), in particular, under a multiplication with the inverse of the term
in square brackets. Thus, problem (34) is identical to the optimization problem in the ILA
economy when setting the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σR = σH and the time
preference rate ρR = ρS .
Proposition 5 (Unconstrained utilitarian OLG and ILA economy)
For an unconstrained utilitarian OLG economy, i.e., a social planner maximizing the social
welfare function (29b) subject to the budget constraint (10b) and the transversality condition
(30), the following statements hold:
14 Note that for ρS = 0 the maximization problem of the unconstrained social planner is not well defined.
15 Such an equivalence was already observed by Calvo and Obstfeld (1988).
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(i) An unconstrained utilitarian OLG economy is observationally equivalent to the ILA econ-
omy if and only if σR = σH and ρR = ρS.
(ii) An unconstrained utilitarian OLG economy is observationally equivalent in the steady
state to an ILA economy if and only if
ρR = ρS + ξ
σR − σH
σRσH
. (36)
The proof is given in the appendix.
Proposition 5 states that, maximizing the utilitarian social welfare function (29b) yields the
same aggregate consumption and capital paths as maximizing the welfare (21) in the ILA model
with σR = σH and ρR = ρS . This result, however, does not imply that the unconstrained social
planner problem can, in general, be replaced by an ILA model.
First, to derive the equivalence result, we have assumed a social planner who does not exhibit
any preferences for smoothing lifetime utility across generations. The parameter σH in equation
(35) stems from the individuals’ preferences to smooth consumption within the lifetime of each
generation. It is therefore a given primitive to the social planner. Thus, the only normative
parameter the social planner may choose is the social time preference rate ρS . It remains an
open question for future research whether a different welfare functional for the unconstrained
utilitarian social planner exists that permits a normative choice of σS for the social planner
and still delivers observational equivalence to an ILA model with ρS = ρR.
Second, in the ILA setting, the first-best solution is easily decentralized, e.g., using taxes that
ensure the optimal path of the aggregate capital stock. However, such implementation may
fail in the case of the unconstrained social planner, because he is also concerned about the
intratemporal allocation of consumption across all generations alive at a certain point in time.
Before we investigate the decentralization of the social optimum in the next section, we compare
the outcome of the OLG economy managed by the unconstrained social planner to that of a
decentralized OLG economy. In all comparisons between a utilitarian and a decentralized OLG
economy, we assume identical preferences of the individual households in both economies.
Proposition 6 (Unconstrained utilitarian OLG and decentralized OLG)
(i) For any economy Γ∗ there exists an unconstrained utilitarian OLG that is observationally
equivalent in the steady state. In such a steady state ρS > ρH .
(ii) In the steady state, an economy Γ∗ and an unconstrained utilitarian OLG exhibit the
same allocation of consumption across the generations alive at each point in time if and
only if they are observationally equivalent in the steady state.
The proof is given in the appendix.
Remark: The converse of (i) is not true, as there exists no economy Γ∗ that would be obser-
vationally equivalent to an unconstrained utilitarian OLG with ρS < ρH .
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Proposition 6 implies that an unconstrained utilitarian OLG economy exhibits the same aggre-
gate steady state as the decentralized OLG economy if and only if the intratemporal distribution
of consumption between all generations alive coincide. For this to hold, the social planner’s rate
of time preference has to be higher than the individual households’ rate of time preference.
6.2 Constrained Utilitarian OLG Economy
As seen in Proposition 6, the optimal solution of a social planner maximizing (29b) subject to
the budget constraint (10b) and the transversality condition (30) is, in general, not identical
to the outcome of a decentralized OLG economy.16 Thus, the question arises whether and if
so how the social optimum is implementable in a decentralized market economy. Calvo and
Obstfeld (1988) show that it is possible to implement the social optimum by a transfer scheme
discriminating by date of birth s and age a. Such a transfer scheme may be difficult to implement
because of its administrative burden. In addition, it is questionable whether taxes and subsidies
which are conditioned on age per se are politically viable.17
As a consequence, we consider a social planner that cannot discriminate transfers by age but
may only influence prices via taxes and subsidies. In particular, we assume that the social
planner may impose taxes/subsidies on capital and labor income. Let τr(t) and τw(t) denote
the tax/subsidy on returns on savings and on labor income, respectively.18 The individual
households of the OLG economy base their optimal consumption and saving decisions on the
effective interest rate re
(
t, τr(t)
)
and the effective wage we
(
t, τw(t)
)
defined by
re
(
t, τr(t)
)
= r(t)− τr(t) , (37a)
we
(
t, τw(t)
)
= w(t)
[
1− τw(t)
]
. (37b)
Then, the individual budget constraint reads
b˙e(t, s) = re
(
t, τr(t)
)
be(t, s) + we
(
t, τw(t)
)
− ce(t, s) . (37c)
Given this budget constraint, individual households choose consumption paths which maximize
lifetime utility (1). Thus, the optimal consumption path ce
(
t, s, {r(t′), τr(t
′), τw(t
′)}s+Tt′=s
)
is a
function of the paths of the interest rate r(t) and the taxes τr(t) and τw(t).
16 Recall that we assume the individual preference parameters to be identical in both economies.
17 We observe policies that redistribute wealth between generations living at the same time, e.g., in education,
health care and old-age pensions. However, we argue that these redistributions use age as a proxy for health
condition, or particular needs, and redistribute from high to low income levels rather than redistributing
because of age per se. Note that the “Age Discrimination Act of 1975” for the US states explicitly that “...no
person in the United States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” In
particular, we consider it unlikely that taxes such as value added tax, income tax, capital tax, which are rather
conditioned on income could instead be conditioned on age. As a consequence, we consider the possibility of
age discriminating taxation and redistribution as rather limited.
18 Following the standard convention, τi(t) is positive if it is a tax and negative if it is a subsidy.
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Note that for a given path of the interest rate and given tax/subsidy schemes {r(t), τr(t),
τw(t)}
s+T
t=s the individual household’s optimal paths of consumption and assets can be char-
acterized as in the decentralized OLG economy by (2) and (4) when using re
(
t, τr(t)
)
and
we
(
t, τw(t)
)
instead of r(t) and w(t), respectively. Applying the aggregation rule (9) yields
aggregate consumption per effective labor ce
(
t, {r(t′), τr(t
′), τw(t
′)}t+Tt′=t−T
)
. To analyze obser-
vational equivalence between such a constrained utilitarian OLG economy and an ILA economy,
we have to restrict redistribution to mechanisms which do not alter the aggregate budget con-
straint (10b) of the economy. We consider the following redistribution scheme which yields a
balanced government budget at all times
τw(t)w(t) = −τr(t)b¯(t) . (37d)
Under these conditions the social optimum is, in general, not implementable.
Proposition 7 (Implementation of the social optimum)
The optimal solution of a social planner maximizing (29b) subject to the budget constraint
(10b) and the transversality condition (30) is not implementable by a tax/subsidy regime satis-
fying (37) unless this solution is identical to the outcome of the unregulated decentralized OLG
economy Γ⋆.
The proof is given in the appendix.
Proposition 7 states that a constrained social planner who can only impose a tax/subsidy
regime on interest and wages cannot achieve the first-best social optimum. The intuition is
that the constrained social planner can achieve the socially optimal aggregate levels of capital
and consumption, but cannot implement the socially optimal intratemporal distribution of
consumption across generations living at the same time. The only exception occurs if the social
optimum happens to be identical to the outcome of the unregulated OLG economy. In this
case, there is no need for the social planner to interfere and, thus, it does not matter whether
the social planner can freely re-distribute consumption among generations or is constrained
to a self-financing tax/subsidy scheme. In all other cases, the constrained social planner will
choose a tax path such as to achieve a second-best optimum. In consequence, Proposition 7
questions the validity of the ILA model in deriving distributional policy advice for a democratic
government that may be limited in conditioning redistribution between generations on age.
7 Stern vs. Nordhaus – A Critical Review of Choosing the Social Rate of Time
Preference
A prime example for questions of intergenerational distribution is the mitigation of anthro-
pogenic climate change, as most of its costs accrue today while the benefits spread over decades
or even centuries. The question of optimal greenhouse gas abatement has been analyzed in in-
tegrated assessment models combining an ILA economy with a climate model. Interpreting
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the ILA’s utility function (21) as a utilitarian social welfare function, intergenerational equity
concerns are closely related to the choice of intertemporal elasticity of substitution σR and the
rate of time preference ρR. This is illustrated well by Nordhaus (2007), who compares two runs
of his open source integrated assessment model DICE-2007. The first run uses his preferred
specifications σR = 0.5 and ρR = 1.5%. The second run employs σR = 1 and ρR = 0.1%, which
are the parameter values chosen by Stern (2007). These different parameterizations cause a
difference in the optimal reduction rate of emissions in the period 2010–2019 of 14% versus
53% and a difference in the optimal carbon tax of 35$ versus 360$ per ton C.
The previous sections derived important differences between the OLG economy and an ILA
model, which have immediate implications for the evaluation of climate change mitigation
polices. This section relates our findings to the positive and to the normative approach to
social discounting.
7.1 The “positive” approach
Under strong assumption on altruism, Barro (1974) interprets finitely lived overlapping genera-
tions as a dynasty and shows how to represent them as an ILA. If we are interested in dynastic
welfare as a whole, then a set of dynasties alive today will efficiently distribute resources across
time under the assumption that all investments are private and there exist complete and undis-
torted future markets. In this context, a project evaluation that uses a discount rate different
from the market interest would generally be inefficient.19 However, the Pareto-efficiency argu-
ment only holds for the different dynasties as a whole. If we are concerned with the welfare of
individual generations, any project evaluation rate will make some future generations better-off,
at the expense of others. Thus, the rate at which we evaluate projects characterizes a particular
distribution of intergenerational welfare, none of which Pareto dominates any other.20
In our framework, where we explicitly account for the different generations and assume that
there is no operative bequest motive,21 this feature becomes even more salient: Individual
households in the decentralized OLG economy live for a finite time span T during which they
exclusively save for their own consumption in old age. As a consequence, market observations
and, in particular, the market interest rate do not reveal any information on households’ prefer-
ences concerning the intergenerational distribution of welfare. The standard positive approach
proceeds in two steps. First, it calibrates an ILA to match real world observation, in particular
the real interest rate. Second, it interprets the ILA as a utilitarian social planner who evaluates
19 This statement only holds for small projects. A large intertemporal transfer can change intertemporal prices
and, thus, the current market rate is no longer the efficient interest and discount rate when implementing the
project.
20 Efficiency dictates that we undertake more lucrative investments first. As Nordhaus (2007) emphasizes, if an
investment in man-made capital is more efficient in raising future welfare than an investment into natural
capital, we first have to invest in man-made capital. Our framework does not address the optimal investment
portfolio, but focuses on intergenerational distribution.
21 We interpret birth as appearance on the labor market. Hence, no operative bequest does not imply an absence
of educational investment in children.
20
a public project. Applying the first step of the positive approach, we showed in Proposition 3
that the rate of time preference of the ILA does not reflect the actual time preference of the
(homogeneous) individuals in the decentralized OLG economy. In particular, if we set the ILA’s
elasticity of intertemporal substitution equal to that of the households (σR = σH), then the
ILA model overestimates the rate of pure time preference for two reasons (ρR > ρH). First, the
ILA plans for an infinite future when taking his market decisions. Households in the OLG econ-
omy, however, only plan for their own lifespan when revealing their preferences on the market.
Interpreting these decisions as if being taken with an infinite time horizon overstates their pure
time preference. Second, the ILA model assumes that the representative consumer accounts
for population growth by giving more weight to the welfare of the larger future population, a
concern absent in the welfare maximization of the households in the OLG economy.
In the second step, the positive approach interprets the ILA framework as a social planner
economy. Proposition 5 indeed verifies observational equivalence between the ILA framework
and an OLG economy with an unconstrained utilitarian social planner economy in an OLG
world. However, Proposition 6 reveals that the pure rate of time preference ρS that is implicitly
assumed for the social planner is larger than the pure rate of time preference of the individuals
living in the economy: ρS > ρH .22 In particular, the finding holds for the feasible interpretation
ρR = ρS and σR = σH , which associates pure time preference of the ILA with that of the social
planner.23
What are the normative assumptions of the positive approach in a world where overlapping
generations only plan for their own life-cycles? The most important assumption is that the pos-
itive approach selects a particular intergenerational weight for the social planner that exceeds
the pure rate of time preference of the individuals living in the economy. While we do not take
a stance on the “right” relationship between the two rates, the positive approach has to justify
its particular choice. As we pointed out in the beginning, the intergenerational weight does not
derive from efficiency arguments, cannot be deduced from the real market interest rate, and
has immediate distributional implications. Moreover, the assumption stands in sharp contrast
to most of the literature on social discounting, which argues for an intergenerational discount
rate that is equal to or lower than the households’ pure time preference rate.
Let us illustrate how the standard positive approach implicitly manipulates discount rates and
time horizons. We start by spelling out the positive welfare function underlying our OLG world,
where households are fully selfish and do not care for future generations. It simply consists of
the sum of the remaining lifetime utilities of the individuals presently alive (and is given by
the first term in the welfare function 29a). Greenhouse gas mitigation would not be optimal
22 The calibration in the first step relies on observational equivalence between the ILA and the decentralized
economy, and the social planner interpretation in the second step relies on observational equivalence between
the ILA and the utilitarian planner model. By transitivity of observational equivalence, we can therefore invoke
Proposition 6.
23 Alternative interpretations imply that σR does not match the intertemporal elasticity of the households σH . In
particular, invoking observational equivalence while setting or interpreting ρR = ρH would require an increase
in the ILA’s consumption discount rate by lowering the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to σR < σH .
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in such an approach, if benefits of mitigation accrue beyond the lifetime of these individuals.
The standard positive approach deviates in two accounts: First, it assumes an infinite time
horizon. Second, it assigns more weight to larger future generations. In order to be consistent
with market observations, both of these deviations force the standard approach to increase
the rate of pure time preference. Thus, in our OLG world, the standard positive approach
seems contradictory: First, it assigns higher weights to future generations. Then, it crowds
these weights out again by increasing impatience.
If the world is correctly represented by overlapping generations that only care for their own
lifetime utility, why should we be concerned, from a purely positive perspective, about long-run
problems such as climate change? Just because intergenerational preferences are not represented
in market transactions reflecting life-cycle savings does not necessarily imply that households
do not exhibit such preferences. Many potential frictions of the socio-economic environment
may lead to an incomplete expression of household preferences (e.g., missing or incomplete
markets, public good properties, imperfect political representation). Then, a positive approach
has to elicit intergenerational preferences in a non-market environment. Votes on long-term
public investments might be a promising setting to elicit such preferences.24 The remaining
assumption in such an approach will have to deal with the precise mapping of, e.g., voting
outcomes to the social planner’s intergenerational discount rate.
If we cannot obtain reliable data on individual’s intergenerational discount rates, we can com-
plement positively observed individual preferences by transparent normative assumptions. The
following approach seems particularly appealing: We adopt the normative assumption that the
social planner should discount consumption at any given point in time independently of the
birth date of the consuming generation. As shown in Proposition 4, this assumption implies that
the intergenerational time preference of the social planner has to equal the pure rate of time
preference of the individuals living in the economy. We can deduce the individuals’ preference
parameters from micro-estimates. However, depending on the context and method, estimates
of the pure rate of time preference and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution vary by an
order of magnitude.25 Therefore, we suggest following the standard positive approach in vali-
dating the preference parameters based on their macro-economic implications (see below). We
acknowledge that the drafted alternative approach contains normative assumptions. However,
they are explicit and likely to be more reasonable in a world without an operative bequest
motive than the implicit assumptions of the standard positive approach.
We close with a numeric illustration that shows how individual preferences deduced from the
macroeconomic equilibrium differ from the observationally equivalent ILA preferences. First,
24 However, one has to account for problems related to intransitivities of voting outcomes, as discussed in Jackson
and Yariv (2011).
25 Considering household data, estimates for the pure rate of time preference range from around zero (Epstein
and Zin 1991, Browning et al. 1999) to about 10% (Andersen et al. 2008). Experimental studies find time
preference rates exceeding even 20%, in particular, if not elicited jointly with the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (Harrison et al. 2005). Estimates for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution range from close
to zero (Hall 1988) to values around 2 (Chen et al. 2011).
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assume an interest rate of r = 5.5% and elasticities σH = σR = .5 as in Nordhaus (2008)
latest version of DICE. Then the rate of pure time preference of the ILA is ρR = 1.5%, while
the individuals of the decentralized OLG economy exhibit a time preference ρH = −5.3%.26
The surprising finding of a negative rate of time preference questions the plausibility of the
above specifications. A simple sensitivity check suggests that increasing the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution is most promising for resolving the negativity puzzle. The more recent
asset pricing literature suggests an estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
σH = 1.5 which, in combination with a disentangled measure of risk attitude, explains vari-
ous asset prizing puzzles.27 Adopting this estimate, we find ρH = 1.9% for the households in
the decentralized OLG economy and a time preference rate of ρR = 4.2% for the ILA. The
wide-spread assumption of logarithmic utility (σH = 1) chosen by Stern (2007) implies that
households have precisely the rate of pure time preference ρH = 0.1% that the review chose for
the social planner based on normative reasoning.
7.2 The normative approach
In a normative approach to social discounting it seems more natural to jump straight to an
ILA model. By normatively justified assumptions the social planner exhibits an infinite plan-
ning horizon and particular values of the time preference rate and the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. It is obvious, however, that the ILA model cannot capture any distinction or
interaction between intergenerational weighting and individual time preference. Nevertheless,
Proposition 5 shows that a social planner fully controlling an OLG economy is observationally
equivalent to an ILA economy if the parameters σR and ρR are appropriately chosen. In partic-
ular, the intertemporal path of aggregate consumption does not depend on the individual rate
of time preference ρH , but only on the social planner’s rate of time preference ρS. In fact, the
time preference rate of the social planner coincides with the rate of time preference ρR of the
observationally equivalent ILA economy. This finding provides some support for Stern’s (2007)
normative approach to intergenerational equity in the ILA model.
However, the shortcut of setting up an ILA economy exhibits a number of caveats as questions
of intergenerational equity are more complex than the ILA model reveals. First, according to
Proposition 5, the interpretation of the time preference rate of the ILA economy as the time
preference rate of a social planner in an observationally equivalent social planner OLG economy
(ρR = ρS) requires that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in the ILA economy be
equal to that of the individual households in the OLG economy, i.e., σR = σH . This constraint,
however, implies that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is a primitive to the social
26 The calculation solves equation (15b) or, alternatively, F (5.5%) = J (5.5%) in the notation introduced in
the proof of Proposition 1. We choose the following exogenous parameters: capital share α = .3, rate of
technological progress ξ = 2%, rate of population growth ν = 0%, and lifetime T = 50.
27 Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio (2003) estimate and Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Bansal et al. (2010)
calibrate intertemporal substitutability to this value based on approaches employing Epstein and Zin (1991)
preferences and Campbell’s (1996) log-linearization of the Euler equation.
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planner and cannot be chosen to match particular normative considerations.28
Second, interpreting the ILA economy as a utilitarian social planner OLG neglects the in-
tratemporal allocation of consumption across all generations alive at each point in time. The
utilitarian OLG model allows us to explicitly analyze the social planner’s optimal intratem-
poral distribution of consumption. As shown in Proposition 4, it depends on the difference
between the social planner’s and the individual households’ rates of time preference. Usually,
it is assumed that the normatively chosen social rate of time preference ρS is smaller than
the individual rate of time preference ρH .29 According to Proposition 4, in this case the oldest
generation receives least consumption while the newborns get most among all generations alive
(see Figure 2, part c). In contrast, the decentralized OLG economy would distribute relatively
more to the old (see Figure 2, part a). As a consequence, the standard discounted utilitarian-
ism implies a trade-off between intertemporal and intratemporal generational equity whenever
households exhibit a positive rate of pure time preference. The aim of ‘treating all generations
alike’ is therefore neither implemented easily in the economy nor captured in the utilitarian
objective function.
Finally, there is an additional caveat, which applies to both the positive and the normative ap-
proach to social discounting. The ILA shortcut to the social planner OLG economy conceals that
the first-best solution has to be implemented in a decentralized OLG instead of a Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans economy. In general, the social optimum not only requires re-distribution across time
but also across different generations living at the same time. Apart, from the question whether
consumption discrimination by age is justified on ethical grounds, it is questionable whether
it is implementable (see page 18 and footnote 17). In Proposition 7 we show that, in gen-
eral, a social planner whose policy instruments are limited to non-age-discriminating taxes and
subsidies cannot implement the first-best solution. In fact, the first-best social optimum can
only be achieved in the special case that it coincides with the outcome of the decentralized
OLG economy without any regulatory intervention. Thus, the ILA economy, interpreted as an
unconstrained social planner model, cannot capture this second-best aspect of optimal policies.
8 Conclusions
In the climate change debate intergenerational trade-offs are most often discussed within ILA
frameworks, which are interpreted as a utilitarian social welfare function. In this paper, we
analyzed to what extent these models can represent the relevant intertemporal trade-offs if an
altruistic bequest motive is non-operative.
28 Note that the social welfare function (29b) we considered does not include any preferences for smoothing
lifetime utility of different generations over time. Of course, such functional forms are conceivable but it is
not clear whether and how such a utilitarian OLG economy translates into an observationally equivalent ILA
economy.
29 This assumption seems particularly reasonable if ρS is close to zero. With respect to the Stern review, it
implies that the individual households’ time preference rates exceed ρS = 0.1%.
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We showed under which conditions an ILA economy is observationally equivalent to (i) a
decentralized OLG economy and (ii) an OLG economy in which a social planner maximizes
a utilitarian welfare function. We found that preference parameters differ in the decentralized
OLG and the observationally equivalent ILA economy. In general, pure time preference of
an ILA planner is higher than pure time preference of the households in the observationally
equivalent OLG economy. Moreover, in a normative setting, a utilitarian social planner faces
a trade-off between intergenerational and intragenerational equity that cannot be captured in
the ILA model. Finally, the limited implementability of the first best allocation can only be
observed and discussed in the OLG context.
Our results have important implications for the recent debate on climate change mitigation
and, more generally, for ILA based integrated assessment and cost benefit analysis that relies
on the Ramsey equation. First, the positive approach to specify the social welfare function
implicitly assumes that the time preference rate of the social planner exceeds the one of the
individual households. Second, the ILA model does not capture the distribution of consumption
among generations alive at a given point in time. The utilitarian OLG model implies that a
more equal treatment of lifetime utilities between present and future generations can come at
the expense of a more unequal treatment of the generations alive at a given point in time –
at least if individuals possess a positive rate of pure time preference. Thus, the utilitarian ILA
in the normative approach to social discounting misses an important generational inequality
trade-off. Third, the ILA approach overlooks a limitation in the implementability that arises
if the intergenerational discount rate of the social planner in a utilitarian OLG economy does
not coincide with the time preference rate of individual households. Then, the social optimum
involves re-distribution among generations at each point in time, which would have to rely on
age-discriminating taxes.
Our analysis employs two central assumptions. First, we assume selfish individual households.
Although several empirical studies suggest that altruistic bequest motives are rather weak,
extending the model to include different degrees of altruism is an interesting venue for future
research. Second, part of our analysis assumes a specific utilitarian social welfare function.
Although commonplace in the literature, this assumption drives some of our results, such as
the trade-off between intra- and intergenerational equity. In particular, discounted utilitari-
anism in general has been questioned as an appropriate approach to deal with questions of
intergenerational equity (e.g., Asheim and Mitra 2010).
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
To prove the existence of a non-trivial steady state, i.e. k⋆ 6= 0, we follow closely part (A) of the
proof of Proposition 2 in Gan and Lau (2010). We re-write equation (15b) for r∗ /∈ {ξ, ν + ξ}
as30
b⋆ =
w⋆
r⋆ − ν − ξ
{
QT (r
⋆ − ξ)
QT (ν)
QT
(
ν + ξ − σH(r⋆ − ρH)
)
QT
(
r⋆ − σH(r⋆ − ρH)
) − 1
}
. (A.1)
We define the function J : R → R by
J(r) ≡
QT (r − ξ)
QT (ν)
QT
(
ν + ξ − σH(r − ρH)
)
QT
(
r − σH(r − ρH)
) , ∀ r ∈ R (A.2)
for which Lemma 4 in Appendix A.9 summarizes some useful properties. Defining further
φ(k) ≡
f(k)− f ′(k)k
f ′(k) − ν − ξ
[
J
(
f ′(k)
)
− 1
]
, (A.3)
the steady state is given by the solution of the equation k = φ(k), or equivalently
λ(k) ≡
J
(
f ′(k)
)
− 1
f ′(k)− ν − ξ
−
k
f(k)− f ′(k)k
= 0 . (A.4)
Note that λ(k) exhibits a removable pole at the golden rule capital stock kgr which is given by
f ′(kgr) = ν + ξ ≡ rgr. By defining
λ(kgr) ≡ lim
k→kgr
λ(k) = J ′
(
f ′(kgr)
)
−
kgr
f(kgr)− f ′(kgr)kgr
(A.5)
where we use l’Hospital’s rule (recognizing that J
(
f ′(kgr)
)
= 1), we establish that λ(k) is a
well-defined and continuous function on k ∈ R. We now show that
lim
k→0
λ(k) = +∞ , and lim
k→∞
λ(k) = −∞ , (A.6)
which proves the existence of k⋆ ∈ (0,∞) with λ(k⋆) = 0 or equivalently φ(k⋆) = k⋆.
For k → 0, f ′(k) tends to ∞, f(k) − f ′(k)k tends to 0 and J
(
f ′(k)
)
tends to ∞. The latter
holds, as limr→∞ J
′(r)/J(r) > 0 (see part (iii) and (v) of Lemma 4), which implies that
30 The equivalence of equation (15b) and (A.1) is easily verified by multiplying over the terms in the denominator
and expanding the resulting expressions. In addition, the domain of the functions making up the right hand
side of equations (15b) and (A.1) can be extended to r∗ ∈ {ξ, ν + ξ} by limit. Both right hand side functions
are continuous and coincide for these points. Thus, the two equations are equivalent for all r⋆.
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limr→∞ J(r) = +∞ and limr→∞ J
′(r) = +∞. Applying l’Hospital’s rule we obtain
lim
k→0
λ(k) = lim
k→0
J ′
(
f(k)
)
−
1
f ′′(k)k
= +∞ , (A.7)
as limk→0 1/(f
′′(k)k) is finite by virtue of assumption (16).
For k → ∞, f(k) tends to ∞ and f ′(k) tends to 0. Thus, the first summand of λ(k) tends to
[1− J(0)]/(ν + ξ), which is finite. For the second summand observe that
lim
k→∞
f(k)− f ′(k)k
k
= lim
k→∞
[
f(k)
k
− f ′(k)
]
= 0 . (A.8)
As f(k)−f ′(k)k > 0 for k > 0 this implies that limk→∞ k/[f(k)−f
′(k)k] = +∞ and, therefore,
limk→∞ λ(k) = −∞. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
To prove the proposition, we re-write the steady state condition (A.3) for k 6= kgr as
f(k)− (ν + ξ)k
f(k)− f ′(k)k
= J
(
f ′(k)
)
, (A.9)
which allows to distinguish between efficient and inefficient steady states. Moreover, we discuss
solutions to equation (A.9) in terms of the interest rate r instead of the capital stock k.
Therefore, we define
F (r) ≡
f
(
k(r)
)
− (ν + ξ)k(r)
f
(
k(r)
)
− f ′
(
k(r)
)
k(r)
, (A.10)
where k(r) = f ′−1(r), which is well defined due to the strict monotonicity of f ′(k). Observe
that k′(r) = 1/f ′′
(
k(r)
)
. The derivative of F with respect to r yields:
F ′(r) =
f ′
(
k(r)
)
− (ν + ξ)
f ′′
(
k(r)
) [
f
(
k(r)
)
− f ′
(
k(r)
)
k(r)
] + k(r) [f(k(r))− (ν + ξ)k(r)][
f
(
k(r)
)
− f ′
(
k(r)
)
k(r)
]2 . (A.11)
Then, for r⋆ 6= rgr, a steady state is given by the solution of the equation F (r⋆) = J (r⋆).
From (A.5) we observe that
J ′ (rgr) =
kgr
f (kgr)− rgrkgr
= F ′ (rgr) , (A.12)
has to hold for r = rgr respectively k = kgr to be a steady state. In addition, we find for r = rgr
that
F (rgr) = 1 = J (rgr) . (A.13)
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From the proof of Proposition 1 follows that, given condition (16) holds, there exists an efficient
steady state with r⋆ > rgr and k⋆ < kgr for F ′ (rgr) > J ′ (rgr). This can be seen from equation
(A.5), which implies λ(kgr) < 0, and limk→0 λ(k) = limr→∞ λ
(
k(r)
)
= +∞. The condition
F ′ (rgr) > J ′ (rgr) is equivalent to condition (18).
We now derive sufficient conditions such that there exists only one steady state k⋆ < kgr.
Suppose that condition (16) holds, which guarantees existence of a dynamically efficient steady
state. There exists only one steady state interest rate r⋆ with r⋆ > rgr if and only if
F ′(r)|r=r⋆ < J
′(r)|r=r⋆ , ∀ r
⋆ > rgr
⇔
F ′(r)
F (r)
∣∣∣∣
r=r⋆
<
J ′(r)
J(r)
∣∣∣∣
r=r⋆
, ∀ r⋆ > rgr . (A.14)
The second line holds, as F (r) = J(r) for all r = r⋆. A sufficient condition for (A.14) to hold
is that
d
dr
(
F ′(r)
F (r)
∣∣∣∣
r=r⋆
)
< 0 ∧
d
dr
(
J ′(r)
J(r)
∣∣∣∣
r=r⋆
)
> 0 , ∀ r⋆ > rgr . (A.15)
From part (ii) and (iv) of Lemma 4 we know that the second condition holds for all r > rgr if,
in case that σ > 1, also condition (19b) holds.
F ′(r)
F (r)
∣∣∣∣
r=r⋆
=
[
r − ν − ξ
f ′′
(
k(r)
) [
f
(
k(r)
)
− (ν + ξ)k(r)
] + k(r)
f
(
k(r)
)
− rk(r)
]∣∣∣∣∣
r=r⋆
(A.16a)
=
[
1
k(r)f ′′
(
k(r)
) (1− 1
F (r)
)
+
k(r)
f
(
k(r)
)
− rk(r)
]∣∣∣∣∣
r=r⋆
(A.16b)
=
[
1
k(r)f ′′
(
k(r)
) (1− 1
J(r)
)
+
k(r)
f
(
k(r)
)
− rk(r)
]∣∣∣∣∣
r=r⋆
(A.16c)
=
k(r)
f
(
k(r)
)
− rk(r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡g1(r)
[
1−
(
1−
1
J(r)
)
f
(
k(r)
)
− rk(r)
−k2(r)f ′′
(
k(r)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡g2(r)
]∣∣∣∣∣
r=r⋆
. (A.16d)
From the second to the third line we employed F (r) = J(r) for all r = r⋆. We show in the
following that g′1(r) ≤ 0 and g
′
2(r) ≥ 0 are sufficient for
d
dr
(
F ′(r)
F (r)
∣∣∣
r=r⋆
)
< 0.
First, observe from equation (A.3) that J (r⋆) > 1 for all r⋆ > rgr. As J(r) is U-shaped on
r ∈ (rrg,∞) because of part (ii) and (iv) of Lemma 4 and J (rgr) = 1, this implies that
J ′ (r⋆) > 0 for all r⋆ > rgr.
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Second, we show that F
′(r)
F (r)
∣∣∣
r=r⋆
> 0 for all r⋆ > rgr if g′2(r) ≥ 0. Observe that
lim
r⋆→∞
F ′(r)
F (r)
∣∣∣∣∣
r=r⋆
= lim
r→∞
[
1
k(r)f ′′
(
k(r)
) (1− 1
J(r)
)
+
k(r)
f
(
k(r)
)
− rk(r)
]
(A.17a)
= lim
r→∞
[
1
k(r)f ′′
(
k(r)
) + k(r)
f
(
k(r)
)
− rk(r)
]
(A.17b)
= lim
r→∞
[
1
k(r)f ′′
(
k(r)
) − 1
k(r)f ′′
(
k(r)
)
]
= 0 . (A.17c)
In addition, we know that g1(r) > 0 for all r > 0 and
lim
r→∞
g1(r) = lim
r→∞
1
k(r)f ′′
(
k(r)
) > 0 . (A.18)
The latter implies together with equation (A.17)
lim
r→∞
g2(r)
(
1−
1
J(r)
)
= 1 . (A.19)
As g2(r)
(
1− 1
J(r)
)
equals zero at r = rgr and is monotonically increasing in r for g′2(r) ≥ 0 = 0,
this implies that F ′(r)/F (r)|r=r⋆ > 0 for all r
⋆ > rgr. Then, we obtain for g′1(r) ≤ 0 and
g′2(r) ≥ 0
d
dr
(
F ′(r)
F (r)
∣∣∣∣
r=r⋆
)
= g′1(r)
[
1−
(
1−
1
J(r)
)
g2(r)
]
− g1(r)g2(r)
J ′(r)
J2(r)
− g1(r)g
′
2(r)
(
1−
1
J(r)
)
< 0 . (A.20)
The conditions s(k) ≥ ǫ(k) and d
dk
(
s(k)
ǫ(k)
)
are sufficient for g′1(r) ≤ 0 and g
′
2(r) ≥ 0. 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
We show that σ(r⋆− ρH)− ξ > 0 is a necessary condition for aggregate assets b⋆ to be strictly
positive in a dynamically efficient steady state, i.e., (σH , ρH) ∈ ΓΨ,T . As b
⋆ = k⋆ holds, this
implies that for k⋆ > 0 the steady state real interest rate must exceed ρH + ξ
σ
.
The household’s wealth, as given by equation (14b), can be re-written to yield
b⋆(a) =
w⋆
r⋆ − ξ
{
θ exp
[(
σ(r⋆ − ρH)− ξ
)
a
]
+ (1− θ) exp[(r⋆ − ξ)a]− 1
}
, (A.21)
with
θ =
1− exp[−(r⋆ − ξ)T ]
1− exp[−(r⋆ − σH(r⋆ − ρ))T ]
. (A.22)
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Assuming a dynamically efficient steady states implies that r⋆ − ξ > 0 and we obtain from
(A.22)
θ


< 1, if σ(r⋆ − ρH)− ξ < 0
= 1, if σ(r⋆ − ρH)− ξ = 0
> 1, if σ(r⋆ − ρH)− ξ > 0
. (A.23)
Thus, we can directly infer from (A.21) that b⋆(a) = 0 for all a ∈ [0, T ] for σ(r⋆ − ρH) − ξ =
0. As all households hold no assets, the aggregate capital stock equals zero. To show that
σ(r⋆ − ρH)− ξ < 0 precludes strictly positive capital stocks, we analyze the second derivative
of b⋆(a)
d2 b⋆(a)
d a2
=
w⋆
r⋆ − ξ
{
θ
(
σ(r⋆ − ρH)− ξ
)2
exp
[(
σ(r⋆ − ρH)− ξ
)
a
]
+ (1− θ)(r⋆ − ξ)2 exp[(r⋆ − ξ)a]
}
. (A.24)
For σ(r⋆ − ρH) − ξ < 0, θ < 1 holds, which implies that d
2b⋆(a)
d a2
> 0. Hence, the household’s
wealth profile is strictly convex. Together with the boundary conditions b⋆(0) = 0 = b⋆(T ) this
implies that all households possess non-positive wealth at all times. This, in turn, precludes
k⋆ > 0.
Further, it is obvious from (A.21) and (A.24) that σ(r⋆ − ρH) − ξ > 0 does not contradict
strictly positive wealth of the individual households and, therefore, is a necessary condition for
k⋆ > 0. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) Both economies exhibit the same technology and rate of population growth by assumption
and, thus, the market equilibria on the capital and the labor market imply that the equations
of motion for the aggregate capital per effective labor (25b) and (10b) coincide. The remaining
difference in the macroeconomic system dynamics is governed by the Euler equations (10a) and
(25a) and by the transversality condition (23).
“⇒”: Suppose the two economies are observationally equivalent, i.e., coincidence in the initial
levels of consumption and capital imply coincidence at all future times. For this to hold the
Euler equations (10a) and (25a) have to coincide giving rise to (26).
“⇐”: If condition (26) holds, then also the Euler equations (10a) and (25a) coincide and the
system dynamics of both economies is governed by the same system of two ordinary first
order differential equations. The solution is uniquely determined by some initial conditions
on c and k. Thus, if the two economies coincide in the levels of consumption and capital at
one point in time they also do so for all future times. In consequence, the two economies
are observationally equivalent. Moreover, the capital stock is an equilibrium of Γ⋆ implying
30
k⋆ < kgr. As a consequence, the transversality condition for the ILA economy is satisfied and,
thus, the described path is indeed an optimal solution.
(ii) Let r⋆ be the steady state interest rate of Γ⋆. Thus, all combinations of
(
ρR, σR
)
which
satisfy
r⋆ = ρR +
ξ
σR
, (A.25)
yield ILA economies which are observationally equivalent in the steady state. As for all Γ⋆,
r⋆ < rgr holds, also the transversality condition (23) is satisfied. 
(iii) The equality part of equation (27) follows directly from (26) by setting σR = σH . For the
steady state, equation (10a) returns 1
σH
[
∆c(t)
c(t) + ν
]
= r(t)− ρH − ξ
σH
which, by Proposition 2,
is strictly positive.
From the respective Euler equations (10a) and (25a) we obtain the condition that
r −
ξ
σR
= ρR > ρH = r −
1
σH
[
∆c(t)
c(t)
+ ν + ξ
]
(A.26)
⇔
σH
σR
<
1
ξ
[
∆c(t)
c(t)
+ ν + ξ
]
(A.27)
which is equivalent to equation (28). 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The optimization problem (31) subject to condition (32) is equivalent to a resource extraction
model (or an isoperimetrical control problem). We denote consumption at time t of an individual
of age a by C(a) ≡ c(t, t−a) and define the stock of consumption left to distribute among those
older than age a by
y(a) = c¯(t)−
∫ a
0
C(a′)γ exp[−νa′] da′ . (A.28)
Then, the problem of optimally distributing between the age groups is equivalent to optimally
‘extracting’ the consumption stock over age (instead of time). The equation of motion of the
stock is dy
da
= −C(a)γ exp[−νa], the terminal condition is y(T ) ≥ 0, and the present value
Hamiltonian reads
H =
C(a)
1− 1
σH
1− 1
σH
γ exp
[
(ρS− ρH− ν)a
]
− λ(a)C(a)γ exp[−νa] , (A.29)
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where λ(a) denotes the co-state variable of the stock y. The first order conditions yield
λ(a) = C(a)
− 1
σH exp
[(
ρS − ρH
)
a
]
, (A.30a)
λ˙(a) = 0 , (A.30b)
which imply that
C(a) = C(0) exp
[
σH(ρS − ρH)a
]
. (A.31)
As λ(T ) is obviously not zero, transversality implies that y(T ) = 0. Therefore, we obtain from
equation (A.28), acknowledging QT (ν) = 1/γ,
C(0) = c¯(t)
QT (ν)
QT
(
ν + σH(ρH − ρS)
) , (A.32)
which, together with equation (A.31), returns equation (33). 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) The equivalence of the unconstrained social planner problem and of the optimization problem
in the ILA economy pointed out in relation to equations (34) and (35) implies the Euler equation
of the unconstrained social planner economy
c˙(t)
c(t)
= σH
[
r(t)− ρS
]
− ξ . (A.33)
For both economies the Euler equation implies that a time varying consumption rate also
implies a time varying interest rate (and obviously so does a time varying capital stock).
For observational equivalence to hold, consumption and interest rate of the unconstrained
utilitarian OLG economy have to coincide with that of the ILA economy, implying the following
equality of the Euler equations
σH
[
r(t)− ρS
]
− ξ = σR
[
r(t)− ρR
]
− ξ
⇔ σRρR − σHρS = (σR − σH)r(t) . (A.34)
For a time varying interest rate this equation can only be satisfied if σR = σH and ρH = ρS .
If σR = σH and ρH = ρS hold, the equivalence of the two problems was explained in relation
to equations (34) and (35).
(ii) Existence of an observationally equivalent ILA economy implies that, first, the ILA economy
has to be in a steady state as well and, second, that the steady state Euler equations have to
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coincide implying
r = ρR −
ξ
σR
= ρS −
ξ
σH
⇒ ρR − ρS = ξ
σR − σH
σRσH
.
The same reasoning applies when starting from the ILA economy steady state and assuming
an observationally equivalent unconstrained utilitarian OLG economy.
If equation (36) is satisfied and the unconstrained utilitarian OLG economy is in a steady state,
equation (A.33) implies
rS = ρS +
ξ
σH
. (A.35)
Using equation (36) to substitute ρS on the right hand side yields
rS = ρR − ξ
σR − σH
σRσH
+
ξ
σH
= ρR +
ξ
σR
= rR . (A.36)
Thus, also the ILA economy is in a steady state (see Section 4) with coinciding interest rate. As
the interest rates coincide, so does the capital stock and so do the consumption paths. Starting
with the ILA steady state with interest rate rR yields a coinciding unconstrained utilitarian
OLG steady state by the same procedure. 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 6
(i) According to the proof of Proposition 5, the Euler equation of the unconstrained social
planner solution is (A.33). In a steady state with interest rate r⋆ it is satisfied for any (obviously
non-empty) set of preference parameters σH and ρS satisfying
ρS +
ξ
σH
= r⋆ . (A.37)
Moreover, by virtue of Proposition 2, ρS = r⋆− ξ
σH
> ρH holds. Note that for all decentralized
economies Γ⋆ r⋆ < rgr. Hence, the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 3 can be applied
to make sure that the budget constraints of the decentralized OLG and the unconstrained
utilitarian social planner OLG coincide. The condition r⋆ < rgr also implies that the social
planner’s transversality condition is satisfied.
(ii) Using (33), we can write the intratemporal allocation of consumption across the generations
alive in steady state in the unconstrained utilitarian OLG as
c⋆S(a) =
c(t, t− a)
exp[ξt]
= c⋆
QT (ν)
QT (ν + σH
(
ρH − ρS)
) exp[−σH(ρH − ρS)a] . (A.38)
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The intratemporal allocation of consumption in the decentralized OLG economy is given by
(14a) and can be written as
c⋆d(a) = c
⋆ QT (ν)
QT (ν + ξ − σH
(
r⋆d − ρ
H)
) exp[(σH (r⋆d − ρH)− ξ)a] , (A.39)
where r⋆d is the steady state interest rate of the decentralized OLG in which the households
exhibit the same preference parameters as in the unconstrained utilitarian OLG economy.
⇒: Suppose that the allocation of consumption across all generations alive at each point is
identical. For this to be the case, the following two equations have to hold simultaneously for
all a ∈ [0, T ]
exp[−σH(ρH − ρS)a] = exp[(σH(r⋆d − ρ
H)− ξ)a] , (A.40a)
σH
(
ρH − ρS) = ξ − σH
(
r⋆d − ρ
H) . (A.40b)
Minor mathematical transformations show that this only holds for
ρS = r⋆d −
ξ
σH
. (A.41)
This is the condition for the unconstrained utilitarian OLG and the decentralized OLG to be
observationally equivalent in steady state.
⇐: Now suppose that the unconstrained utilitarian OLG and the decentralized OLG are ob-
servationally equivalent in steady state, i.e., equation (A.41) is satisfied.
Inserting ρS as given by (A.41) into (A.38) yields
c⋆S(a) = c
⋆ QT (ν)
QT (ν + ξ − σH
(
r⋆d − ρ
H)
) exp[(σH(r⋆d − ρH)− ξ)a] , (A.42)
which is identical to (A.39). Hence, observational equivalence in steady state is also sufficient
for identical allocations across the generations alive in both economies. 
A.8 Proof of Proposition 7
We show that the constrained social planner can implement the steady state social optimum
with a tax/subsidy regime on interest and wages only if the steady states of the first-best
optimum and the decentralized OLG economy coincide. This implies that the first-best solution
is, in general, not implementable, as every first-best solution converges to a non-implementable
steady state.
We show that for a given steady state, the intratemporal distribution of consumption coincides
in the constrained and the unconstrained utilitarian OLG economy if and only if τ⋆r = 0. To
see this consider an unconstrained utilitarian OLG economy in steady state. The household
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problem in the constrained utilitarian OLG economy is identical to the household problem in
the decentralized economy if we substitute r(t) by re(t) and w(t) by we(t). Solving for individual
consumption and wealth in the steady states yields analogously to equations (14a) and (14b):
ce⋆(a) ≡
ce(t, s)
exp[ξt]
∣∣∣∣
k=k⋆
= we⋆
QT (r
e⋆− ξ)
QT
(
re⋆− σH(re⋆− ρH)
) exp [(σH(re⋆− ρH)− ξ)a] , (A.43a)
be⋆(a) ≡
be(t, s)
exp[ξt]
∣∣∣∣
k=k⋆
= we⋆Qa
(
re⋆− σH(re⋆− ρH)
)
exp[(re⋆− ξ)a]
×
[
Qa(r
e⋆− ξ)
Qa
(
re⋆− σH(re⋆− ρH)
) − QT (re⋆− ξ)
QT
(
re⋆− σH(re⋆− ρH)
)
]
,
(A.43b)
where re⋆ = re(t) and we⋆ = we(t)/ exp[ξt], both evaluated at the steady state. Following the
aggregation rule (9), we derive for aggregate steady state consumption and wealth:
ce⋆ = we⋆
QT (r
e⋆ − ξ)
QT (ν)
QT
(
ν + ξ − σH(re⋆ − ρH)
)
QT
(
re⋆ − σH(re⋆ − ρH)
) , (A.44a)
be⋆ =
we⋆
re⋆ − ξ
[
QT (ξ + ν − r
e⋆)
QT (ν)
− 1
]
−
we⋆
re⋆ − σH(re⋆ − ρH)
×
QT (r
e⋆ − ξ)
QT (ν)
QT (ξ + ν − r
e⋆)−QT
(
ξ + ν − σH(re⋆ − ρH)
)
QT
(
re⋆ − σH(re⋆ − ρH)
) . (A.44b)
Inserting equation (A.44a) into equation (A.43a), we obtain the following intratemporal distri-
bution of consumption
ce⋆(a) = ce⋆
QT (ν)
QT (ν + ξ − σH(re⋆ − ρH))
exp
[(
σH(re⋆ − ρH)− ξ
)
a
]
. (A.45)
By virtue of equation (33), however, the steady state intertemporal distribution of consumption
in the social optimum yields:
c⋆(a) = c⋆
QT (ν)
QT (ν − σH(ρS − ρH))
exp
[(
σH(ρS − ρH)
)
a
]
. (A.46)
Aggregate equivalence requires that ce⋆ = c⋆. Distributional equivalence at a point in time
requires moreover that equation (A.45) and equation (A.46) coincide. Together these conditions
imply that σH(re⋆ − ρH) − ξ = σH(ρS − ρH) ⇔ re⋆ = ρS + ξ
σH
. Thus, by equation (A.37), it
must be re⋆ = r⋆ and therefore τ⋆r = 0. 
A.9 Characteristics of the functions characterizing the steady state capital stock
Lemma 3
The function QT (r) defined in (13) satisfies:
(i) QT (r) > 0 for all r ∈ R,
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(ii) Q′T (r) < 0 for all r ∈ R.
The function
q(r) ≡
Q′T (r)
QT (r)
=
T
exp(rT )− 1
−
1
r
, (A.47)
satisfies
(iii) q(r) < 0 for all r ∈ R,
(iv) limr→∞ q(r) = 0 and limr→−∞ q(r) = −T ,
(v) q′(r) = q′(−r) > 0 for all r ∈ R,
(vi) q′(r) > z2q′(zr) for all r ∈ R, z ∈ (0, 1),
(vii) y2q′(yr) > z2q′(zr) for all r ∈ R, y > z ≥ 1,
(viii) q′′(r) < 0 for all r ∈ R++.
Proof: (i) Obviously, QT (r) > 0 for all r 6= 0. In addition, limr→0QT (r) = T > 0.
(ii) We obtain
Q′
T
(r) = −
1− exp[−rT ](1 + rT )
r2
.
For all r 6= 0:
Q′T (r) < 0 ⇔ exp[−rT ](1 + rT ) < 1 ⇔ 1 + rT < exp[rT ] .
The last inequality holds as x+1 < exp[x] for all x ∈ R. In addition, limr→0Q
′
T (r) = −
T 2
2 < 0.
(iii) Follows directly from items (i) and (ii).
(iv) Follows directly from the definition (A.47).
(v) We obtain:
q′(r) = −
1
r2
−
T 2 exp[−rT ]
(1− exp[−rT ])2
=
1
r2
−
T 2
2(cosh[rT ]− 1)
.
For all r 6= 0:
q′(r) > 0 ⇔ 2(cosh[rT ]− 1) > r2T 2 ⇔ cosh[rT ] > 1 +
r2T 2
2
.
The last inequality holds as cosh[x] > 1 + x
2
2 for all x ∈ R. In addition, limr→0 q
′(r) = T
2
12 > 0.
(vi) The statement holds if and only if:
q′(r)− z2q′(zr) =
z2T 2
2(cosh[zrT ]− 1)
−
T 2
2(cosh[rT ]− 1)
> 0
⇔ z2(cosh[rT ]− 1) > cosh[zrT ]− 1 .
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To see that the last inequality holds, we employ the infinite series expansion of cosh[x]:
z2(cosh[x]− 1)− (cosh[zx]− 1) = z2
(
∞∑
n=0
x2n
(2n)!
− 1
)
−
(
∞∑
n=0
(zx)2n
(2n)!
− 1
)
= z2
∞∑
n=1
x2n
(2n)!
−
∞∑
n=1
(zx)2n
(2n)!
=
∞∑
n=1
x2n
(2n)!
(
z2 − z2n
)
> 0 .
The inequality holds, as the first summand is zero and all other terms are strictly positive for
all z ∈ (0, 1). (vii) The statement holds if and only if:
y2q′(yr)− z2q′(zr) =
z2T 2
2(cosh[zrT ]− 1)
−
y2T 2
2(cosh[yrT ]− 1)
> 0
⇔ z2(cosh[yrT ]− 1) > y2 cosh[zrT ]− 1 .
Employing the infinite series expansion of cosh[x], we obtain
z2(cosh[yx]− 1)− y2(cosh[zx] − 1) = z2
(
∞∑
n=0
(yx)2n
(2n)!
− 1
)
− y2
(
∞∑
n=0
x2n
(2n)!
− 1
)
= z2
∞∑
n=1
(yx)2n
(2n)!
− y2
∞∑
n=1
(yx)2n
(2n)!
=
∞∑
n=1
x2n
(2n)!
z2y2
(
y2(n−1) − z2(n−1)
)
> 0 .
The inequality holds, as the first summand is zero and all other terms are strictly positive for
all y > z ≥ 1.
(viii) We obtain:
q′′(r) = −
2
r3
+
2T 3 sinh[rT ]
(2 cosh[rT ]− 2)2
= −2T 3
(
1
(rT )3
+
sinh[rT ]
(2 cosh[rT ]− 2)2
)
Then, the statement holds if and only if (cosh[x]− 2)2 > x3 sinh[x]. To see this, we employ the
infinite series expansion of cosh[x] and sinh[x]
(
2
∞∑
n=0
x2n
(2n)!
− 2
)2
− x3
∞∑
n=0
x2n+1
(2n+ 1)!
=
(
2
∞∑
n=1
x2n
(2n)!
)2
−
∞∑
n=0
x2n+4
(2n + 1)!
= 4
(
∞∑
n=1
x2n
(2n)!
)2
−
∞∑
n=0
x2n+4
(2n + 1)!
Both series exhibit all even powers of x starting with x4:
x4
(
4
2!2!
− 1
)
+ x6
(
2 · 4
2!4!
−
1
3!
)
+ x8
(
2 · 4
2!6!
+
4
4!4!
−
1
5!
)
+ · · · ≥ 0 .
The inequality holds as the first term is zero and all other terms are strictly positive for all
x ∈ R++. 
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Lemma 4
For all ξ, ν ∈ R++ the function J defined in (A.2) satisfies
(i) J(r) > 0.
For all ξ, ν ∈ R++ and σ
H ∈ (0, 1] the function J satisfies
(ii) d
dr
(
J ′(r)
J(r)
)
> 0 for all r ≥ ξ,
(iii) limr→∞
J ′(r)
J(r) = σ
H T .
For all ξ, ν ∈ R++ and σ
H > 1 the function J satisfies
(iv) d
dr
(
J ′(r)
J(r)
)
> 0 for all r ≥ ν + ξ and ρH < σ
H−1
σH
(ν + ξ),
(v) limr→∞
J ′(r)
J(r) = T .
Proof: (i) Follows immediately from QT (r) > 0 for all r ∈ R as shown in Lemma 3.
(ii) Using the definition (A.47), we obtain
J ′(r)
J(r)
= q(r− ξ)−σHq
(
ν + ξ − σH
(
r − ρH
))
−
(
1− σH
)
q
(
r − σH
(
r − ρH
))
, (A.48a)
and
M(r) ≡
d
dr
(
J ′(r)
J(r)
)
=
J ′′(r)
J(r)
−
(
J ′(r)
J(r)
)2
(A.48b)
= q′(r − ξ) +
(
σH
)2
q′
(
ν + ξ − σH
(
r − ρH
))
−
(
1− σH
)2
q′
(
r − σH
(
r − ρH
))
.
For σH ∈ (0, 1] set x = r − ξ and restrict attention to all x ≥ 0
M(x) = q′(x) +
(
σH
)2
q′
(
ν +
(
1− σH
)
ξ − σH
(
x− ρH
))
−
(
1− σH
)2
q′
((
1− σH
)
x+
(
1− σH
)
ξ + σHρH
)
> q′(x)−
(
1− σH
)2
q′
((
1− σH
)
x+
(
1− σH
)
ξ + σHρH
)
≥ q′(x)−
(
1− σH
)2
q′
((
1− σH
)
x
)
≥ 0 .
The first inequality holds due to part (v), the second inequality due to part (viii) and the last
inequality due to part (vi) of Lemma 3.
(iii) Follows directly from equation (A.48a) and part (iv) of Lemma 3.
(iv) For σH > 1 and ρH < σ
H−1
σH
(ν + ξ) consider only r ≥ ν + ξ
M(r) = q′(r − ξ) +
(
σH
)2
q′
(
σHr − σHρH − (ν + ξ)
)
−
(
σH − 1
)2
q′
((
σH − 1
)
r + σHr
)
>
(
σH
)2
q′
(
σHr − σHρH − (ν + ξ)
)
−
(
σH − 1
)2
q′
((
σH − 1
)
r + σHr
)
>
(
σH
)2
q′
(
σHr
)
−
(
σH − 1
)2
q′
((
σH − 1
)
r
)
≥ 0
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The first inequality holds due to part (v), the second inequality due to part (viii) and the last
inequality due to part (vii) of Lemma 3.
(v) Follows directly from equation (A.48a) and part (iv) of Lemma 3. 
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